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NOTES
RESPECT FOR PICKET LINES
INTRODUCTION 1
A great deal has been written about the notorious reluctance of
workers to cross picket lines' and the fact that such a refusal is tradi-
tional in the American labor movement.3 There is, however, a relatively
small number of judicial and administrative decisions delineating the
rights of employees upon refusing to cross a picket line.4
The question of an employee's rights upon refusing to cross a picket
line turns on the type of picket line involved.5 Where an employee re-
fuses to cross a legal picket line around his own employer's installation,
there is little dispute that he is engaging in activity protected by section
1. The writer wishes to acknowledge the assistance and guidance of Professor Julius
Getman in the writing of this note. Valuable insight was gained by reading, prior to
its publication in the University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Professor Getman's article,
entitled The Protection of Economic Pressure by § 7 of the NLRA, which contains a more
general analysis of some of the problems discussed herein.
2. O'Conner, Respecting Picket Lines: A Union View, N.Y.U. 7TH CONF. ON LABOR
235 (1954); Kennedy, The "Right" to Refuse to Cross a Picket Line: Limitations Im-
posed by Courts and Legislation, 2 ST. Louis L. REv. 66 (1952).
3. Thatcher & Finley, Respect for Picket Lines, 32 NEB. L. REv. 25 (1952).
4. The scarcity of judicial and administrative authority on this entire problem of
employees' respect for picket lines may be attributed to a combination of two factors.
First, where a bargaining unit which performs an essential function to a plant goes out on
strike, it often succeeds in curtailing the entire operations of the company. See REYNOLDS,
LABOR ECONOMICS AND LABOR RELATIONS 278-79 (4th ed. 1964). Where the plant is phy-
sically shut down by a strike, there is usually no need for suppliers, customers, or em-
ployees of a different bargaining unit to attempt to enter the premises and encounter the
picket line. Second, the most common situation in which an employee may be required, in
the course of his job, to determine whether or not to cross a picket line around another
employer's installation involves deliveries by truck drivers. Auto Parts Co., 107 N.L.R.B.
242 (1953); Rockaway News Supply Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 336 (1951), rev'd, 197 F.2d 111 (2d
Cir. 1952), afl'd, 345 U.S. 71 (1953); Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961),
modified, 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), afl'd sub nom. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d
1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963); L. G. Everist, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 193 (1963), rev'd, 334 F.2d 312
(8th Cir. 1964) ; Overnite Transp. Co., 154 N.L.R.B. No. 98 (1965), aff'd sub norn. Team-
sters Local 728 v. NLRB, 4 CCH LAB. L. REP. (53 Lab. Cas.) q1 17129 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
The majority of these drivers are members of various Teamster Locals, a substantial num-
ber of which now have clauses in their collective bargaining agreements allowing a
driver to refuse to cross a legal picket line, regardless of its location, and immunizing
him from any disciplinary action by the employer for the refusal to cross the picket line.
Teamsters Local 413, 140 N.L.R.B. 1474 (1963), modified, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1964);
Teamsters Local 386, 145 N.L.R.B. 1475 (1964), modified, 152 N.L.R.B. 78 (1965); Team-
sters Local 559, 145 N.L.R.B. 772 (1964); Teamsters Local 728, 140 N.L.R.B. 1436 (1963).
5. Cooper Thermometer Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 502 (1965).
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7 of the National Labor Relations Act,' whether or not he is a member of
the picketing union or the bargaining unit it represents. The more
difficult question arises where an employee, while performing his as-
signed duties, refuses to cross a legal picket line at an installation of an-
other employer. Employee rights in this situation is the topic of this
note.
Although the Board has vacillated in its position with respect to
such refusals," it appears to have finally solidified its position that such
activity is protected.9 An employer, however, may terminate an employee
for this refusal, even though the refusal is protected, if it is done solely
to preserve his normal operations and so that he can immediately or
within a short time replace the discharged employee by another who is
willing to perform the scheduled work.1 °
Unfortunately, the Board has not articulated the reasons why an
employee's refusal to cross a picket line in this situation should be pro-
tected, except to state that this conduct is definitely concerted activity for
6. 61 Stat. 140 [1947, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964]: "Employees shall have the right to
self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concertel activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection...."
7. John Swift & Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 394 (1959), modified, 277 F.2d 641 (7th Cir.
1960); Cooper Thermometer Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 502 (1965); Potlatch, Inc., 87 N.L.R.B. 1193
(1949); Canada Dry Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. 1763 (1965). But see NLRB v. Illinois Bell Tel.
Co., 189 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 885 (1951). The Board reasons
that although the employee who refused to cross the picket line at his own plant may not
be directly involved in the dispute which gave rise to the strike and picket line, his refusal
to cross the line and report for work constitutes an act of alignment with the protesting
union which amounts to "concerted activities" for "mutual aid or protection" within the
meaning of § 7. The employee who refuses to cross such a picket line, in effect, joins the
strike and is entitled to the same protection as the strikers. He may not be discharged
for engaging in his protected activity for refusing to cross the picket line. Such an em-
ployee, however, may be permanently replaced while he remains off the job, provided it is
done without discrimination on account of union activities. If he is not replaced at the
time of his unconditional application for reinstatement, he must be reinstated.
8. In Cyril de Cordova & Bros., 91 N.L.R.B. 1121 (1950), the Board held that an
employee's refusal, in the course of his duties, to cross a legal picket line at another
employer's plant was protected activity. It affirmed this position in Rockaway News
Supply Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 336 (1951), rev'd 197 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1952), aff'd 345 U.S.
71 (1953). Then in Auto Parts Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 242 (1953), the Board refused to make
any determination as to the nature of this activity or to interfere with the employer's
discharge of a worker who refused to cross a picket line at another employer's instal-
lation. In the first Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961), decision, the Board
declared that such a refusal was unprotected. Subsequently, however, in the second Red-
wing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), aff'd sub nor. Teamsters Local 79 v.
NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963), case, it reitified its original position that an
employee's refusal to cross a picket line at another employer's installation was indeed
protected by § 7.
9. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), aff'd sub nom. Teamsters Local
79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
10. Ibid.
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mutual aid or protection" within the meaning of section 7 of the National
Labor Relations Act.
REASONS FOR GRANTING PROTECTION TO REFUSALS
The primary purpose of the Wagner Act was to allow employees to
make common cause with each other 2 and to permit them to use economic
pressure in support of their cause without fear of employer retaliation. 3
This policy is expressed in section 7 of the act.'4 In addition to guaran-
teeing employees the right to form, join, and assist labor unions, and to
bargain collectively, section 7 guarantees their right to engage in other
concerted activities for mutual aid or protection. Section 8(a) (1)" 5
insures employees that they will not suffer from employer interference or
retaliation for engaging in conduct protected by section 7.
In order to prevent the Board and courts from narrowly construing
the category of employees who would be protected in exercising the rights
of section 7, Congress defined employees in section 2(3)"' to include
"any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer, . . . whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in
connection with, any current labor dispute. . . ." Congress also guar-
anteed that section 7 protection would extend to employees who stopped
work in support of a labor dispute not involving their own employer by
defining the term labor dispute in section 2 (9)17 to cover "any controversy
regardless of whether the disputants stand in proximate relation
of employee and employer."
Read together, sections 2(3) and 2(9) esatblish that the same
protection conferred on employees who cease work as a consequence of
11. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961): "Such activity is literally
for "mutual aid or protection," as well as to assist a labor organization, within the
meaning of Section 7. Contrary to the language of the Board's former decision, therefore,
we find that the employees of Redwing engaged in protected concerted activity when they
refused to cross the . .. picket line."
12. 79 CONG. REc. 2332 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1935), 2 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONs ACT 2431 (Gov't Printing Office 1935) (hereinafter cited
LEG. HisT. NLRA), (remarks of Representative Boland): '"This section [71 seeks to equal-
ize the bargaining power of employers and employees by permitting the latter to pool
their strength."
13. 79 CONG. REc. 7668 (daily ed. May 16, 1935), 2 LEG. HIsT. NLRA 2381, (remarks
of Senator Norris): "the employer has almost unlimited economic power in dealing with
... the employee. The employee has no economic power.... He [the employer] has
many methods of exercising his economic power. The employee has none.... We ought
to consider this amendment [§ 8(a) (1)] in the light of this history running back a great
many years."
14. See note 6 supra.
15. National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1)
(1964). "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7...."
16. National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964).
17. National Labor Relations Act 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 152(9) (1964).
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a dispute with their own employer was also conferred on employees who
engage in sympathetic work stoppages in connection with disputes to
which they are not immediate parties. It follows, therefore, that an
employee who refuses to cross a picket line at another employer's installa-
tion is the type of employee who was guaranteed, under the original
Wagner Act, the protection of section 7 to engage in "concerted activi-
ties for . . .mutual aid or protection."'"
Even though an employee who refuses to cross a picket line may be
within the group that Congress intended to protect, it must still be de-
termined if their conduct falls within section 7 as concerted activity for
mutual aid or protection. If it does not, it cannot be protected.
There is no doubt that an employee acting by himself' 9 can engage
in concerted activity within the meaning of section 7. It has been sug-
gested, however, that an employee's refusal to cross a picket line at another
employer's premises, although concerted, is not for his own mutual aid
or protection but is for the benefit of those in a different installation"
and therefore cannot be protected.
It has never been denied, however, that where one worker suffers
at the hands of his employer and his co-workers strike in protest of this
treatment, these workers are engaging in activity for mutual aid or pro-
tection within section 7. This is true even though the injured worker
is the only one with an immediate stake in the outcome of the strike.2
By going out on strike the other employees seek to insure that if any
one of them ever suffers mistreatment at the hands of the employer, he
will also receive the support of his fellow workers. Therefore, each in-
dividual's participation in the strike, although he may have no vital stake
in the outcome of the immediate dispute, is viewed as an action taken
for his own mutual aid or protection as well as for that of his fellow
employees.
The same reasoning can be applied with equal force when an em-
ployee refuses to cross a picket line surrounding an installation of an
employer other than his own. Again the employee does not have a direct
interest in the outcome of the particular dispute, but by respecting the
18. See NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir.
1942).
19. See Walls Mfg. Co. v. NLRB., 137 N.L.R.B. 1313 (1962).
20. In Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 88 N.L.R.B. 1171, rev'd. 189 F.2d 124 (7th Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 324 U.S. 885 (1952), employees in one bargaining unit refused to cross a
legal picket line of employees in a different bargaining unit surrounding their plant.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that such refusals could not be for the
mutual aid or protection of the refusing employees since the picketing workers were in a
bargaining unit located in a different plant of the company than the refusing employees.
In Canada Dry Corp., 154 N.L.R.B. 134 (1965), the Board specifically rejected the
Seventh Circuit's decision.
21. NLRB v. Peter Cailler Kohler Swiss Chocolates Co., 130 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1942).
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other union's picket line he gains assurance that the number who will
come to his aid when he is involved in a similar dispute will be increased.
His refusal to cross the line, therefore, is as much for his own aid or
protection as when he strikes over his fellow worker's grievances. In the
words of Judge Hand,
So too of those engaging in a sympathetic strike.
The immediate quarrel does not concern them, but by extending
the number of those who will make the enemy of one, the enemy
of all, the power of each is greatly increased. It is one thing
how far a community should allow such power to grow; but,
whatever may be the proper place to check it, each separate ex-
tension is certainly a step in mutual aid or protection.22
Judge Hand points out what was well-understood under the original Wag-
ner Act-that economic pressure in support of the employees of another
employer was an activity for mutual aid or protection under section 7
of the act, regardless of whether it was secondary in nature.
The 1947 Taft-Hartley 8(b) (4)2" amendment to the Wagner Act
made many of these traditional secondary pressures unfair labor practices.
However, the refusal of an employee to cross a primary picket line at
22. Id. at 508.
23. 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (B) (1964):
b. It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its
agents-
(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed
by any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce to
engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manu-
facture, process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles,
materials, or commodities or to perform any services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce,
or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce,
where in either case an object thereof is-
(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling,
transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products of any other producer, processor,
or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or forcing
or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organiza-
tion as the representative of his employees unless such a labor organization has
been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of
section 9:
Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make
unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing;
Provided, That nothing in this subsection [b] shall be construed to make un-
lawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any employer
(other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged
in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees whom
such employer is required to recognize under this act ....
In addition, §§ 8(b)(4)(A) and 8(e) contain regulations of secondary pressure.
§ 8(b) (4) (A) originally contained the pertinent provisions in regard to secondary pres-
sures now contained in § 8(b) (4) (B).
RESPECT FOR PICKET LINES
another employer's installation is not prohibited by section 8(b) (4).24
Nevertheless, it has been suggested 25 that the policy behind 8 (b) (4) was
to limit the amount of secondary pressures to which a neutral employer
can be subjected and, therefore, although it may not be illegal for an
employee to refuse to cross a primary picket line at another employer's
plant, this activity should no longer be protected by section 7.
This view, however, is extremely tenuous in light of the legislative
history and language of the section itself. The legislative history of
this amendment indicates that 8(b) (4) was the result of a hard fought
battle between opposing views in Congress. 26  The final wording of the
section indicates the exact extent to which the legislators intended to
limit the Wagner Act's policy of allowing employees to make common
cause with each other free from any restraints."
The amended act outlawed certain forms of secondary pressures but
left unchanged the right of labor to use primary picketing28 and, by the
explicit wording of the proviso to 8(b) (4),29 the traditional right of
employees to respect primary picket lines around other employer's prem-
ises. It would, therefore, be erroneous to remove an employee's refusal
to cross a primary picket line from the protection of section 7 on the
basis of the policy behind 8(b) (4) when the express wording of this
24. National Labor Relations Act, 73 Stat. 542 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (1964).
"[P]rovided, that nothing contained in the subsection [b] shall be construed to make
unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any employer (other than
his own employer), if the employees of such employer are engaged in a strike ratified
or approved by a representative of such employees whom such employer is required
to recognize under this Act...."
25. Note, 78 HAv. L. REv. 1488 (1965); Note, Rejusal to Cross Picket Lines, 50
CoR zELu L.Q. 691, 697 (1965).
26. 93 CoNG. REc. 4156 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1947), 2 LEGIsLATTVE HISTORY OF THE
LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT 1047 (Gov't Printing Office 1947) (hereinafter cited
LEG. HIST. LMRA) (remarks of Senator Murray); 93 CONG. REc. 4321 (daily ed. Apr. 29,
1947), 2 LEG. HisT. LMRA 1104 (remarks of Senator Pepper); 93 CONG. REc. 4898 (daily
ed. May 8, 1947), 2 LEG. Hisr. LMRA 1341 (remarks of Senator Thomas).
27. See 93 CONG. REc. 4323 (daily ed. Apr. 29, 1947), 2 LEG. HIST. LMRA 1106
(remarks of Senator Taft); "All this provision of the bill does is to reverse the effects of
the law as to secondary boycotts." Also, § 13 of the act was amended to insure that
nothing "except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed .. . to ... impede
... in any way the right to strike.. . ." In addition, H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st
Sess. 21 (1959), 1 LEGislATIvE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND
DISCLOsuRE ACT 779 (Gov't Printing Office 1959) (hereinafter cited as LEG. HiST. LMRDA):
"It is now settled law that the ... Act does not require a truck driver to cross a primary
picket line... ".
28. As Judge Prettyman pointed out in Seafarers Union v. NLRB, 119 N.L.R.B. 1638(1958), rev'd, 265 F.2d 585, 591 (D.C. Cir. 1959), "No matter how great the pressure on
a neutral employer may be when someone else's business is picketed, it is essentially dif-
ferent from the pressure such a neutral feels when his own business is picketed. This
difference in pressure ... is the rationale which must govern . . . the interpretation
of 8b4."
29. See note 24 supra.
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provision and its legislative history negate such exclusion."0
In addition, when Congress adopted 8(b) (4) it re-enacted the defini-
tions of employee and labor dispute, 31 thereby rejecting the notion that
employees could enjoy the protection of section 7 only when they ceased
work because of a dispute with their own employer.
Although the Board is undoubtedly correct in holding that refusals
to cross picket lines at another employer's plant remains within the literal
language of section 7, unaffected by the 8(b) (4) amendment, it does not
necessarily follow that such activity must be protected. Cases involving
solicitation of union members by employees on company property during
working time present an example of conduct that is clearly within the
literal wording of section 7, but which is denied protection. 2 In these
cases, the Board reached its decision by balancing the extent of interfer-
ence with the employer's business against the extent of interference with
the employee's right to organize as guaranteeed by section 7. It con-
cluded that the interference with the employer's business was so great,
and the interference with the right to organize so small, that a company
rule prohibiting such solicitation during working time is presumptively
valid and an employee can be fired for breaking it."
In the picket line cases the Board did not initially balance the em-
ployer's need to conduct his business efficiently against the employee's
right to engage in this form of concerted activity for mutual aid or
protection before it declared that a refusal to cross the picket line during
working time was protected.3 4  Instead, the Board deferred taking ac-
count of the employer's interest until it was ready to determine the allow-
able response an employer could make to this protected activity in order
to preserve his business. 3 Nevertheless, it seems that there exists in
30. It has been suggested that the § 8(b)(4) proviso, by its explicit language, can
be used as a basis of giving protection to refusals to cross picket lines only if the lines
meet its specifications. Such an interpretation has been completely ignored by the
Board. The history of this proviso supports the Board's position. This proviso was
originally a part of the Ball Bill which would have made it illegal for a minority union
to attempt, at any time, to gain recognition for its demands. In the Senate Labor Com-
mittee hearings, Senator Ball explained that the proviso was designed to exempt "the
refusal of employees to cross a legitimate picket line." Under the Ball Bill a refusal to
cross a picket line not meeting the specifications of the proviso would have been a re-
fusal to cross an illegal picket line. The final § 8(b)(4), however, did not contain this
complete prohibition on minority picketing, but the proviso was brought into the new
bill without change. The most, therefore, which should be said about this proviso was
that it was intended to exempt employee's refusals to cross legal picket lines from the
final prohibitions of § 8(b) (4).
31. See text at note 16 supra.
32. Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828 (1943).
33. id. at 844.
34. See text at note 10 supra.
35. See Redwing Carriers, Inc., 130 N.L.R.B. 1208 (1961), modified, 137 N.L.R.B.
1545 (1962), ajf'd sub nom. Teamsters Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir.
1963).
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this situation enough interference with the employee's rights to permit
the Board to balance the opposing interests initially and still declare the
activity protected.
It cannot be denied that employees' refusals to cross picket lines
while they are on the job can greatly interfere with their employer's opera-
tions. This interference, however, must be weighed against the fact
that a refusal to cross a picket line is the type of concerted activity that
can be used for mutual aid or protection by an employee, as an "em-
ployee,"36 only when he is working. When an employee refuses to cross
a picket line to make deliveries, he joins with the striking workers as
a fellow employee in attempting to exert economic pressure against the
employer involved in the dispute. By denying protection to such refusals
and forcing employees to cross a picket line to avoid discharge, the ability
of the employee to make common cause with his fellow employees in the
capacity of an "employee" is not merely interfered with-it is completely
destroyed." This fact lends support to the Board's position that the
refusal should be protected. The fact that a neutral employer, one who
has done nothing to cause the labor dispute which gave rise to the picket
line, may be adversely affected by refusals to cross the line would seem
to weigh heavily toward declaring a refusal to be unprotected. Balanced
against this, however, is the policy of the National Labor Relations Act,
as amended, of allowing employees to make common cause with each
other free of employer retaliation regardless of whether the employees
stand in direct relationship with the employer whose actions are being
disputed.3" If the incidental harm to a neutral employer could be used
to declare a refusal to cross a picket line unprotected, this policy would
be completely undermined.
Also to be considered in balancing the opposing interests is the
harmful side effect that denying employees the right to refuse to cross
picket lines would have on other forms of concerted activity for mutual
aid or protection. It is true that section 7 merely guarantees the right
36. If an employee respects a picket line while he is off the job, he is acting not
in his capacity of "employee" under § 2(3) of the act, but as a consumer. Only during
working time is the employee, therefore, in the position of uniting in a common cause
with his fellow workers under the protection of the act.
37. The Board's position in solicitation cases of allowing an employer to fire an
employee for violating a company rule against soliciting union members on working
time was formulated in the normal industrial situation where there were ample opportu-
nities available for organizational activity, without using working time, and without
severely limiting this right. Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 844 (1943), points
out, however, that such a rule prohibiting union solicitation is only presumptively valid.
Where a union can show an imbalance in its right to engage in organizational activities
is being created by the rule, the employee's right to engage in this § 7 activity may out-
weigh the interest of the employer in conducting his business without interference dur-
ing working time.
38. See text at note 16 supra.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
to engage in these activities and not the effectiveness of them,89 but one
of the major purposes of section 7 was to make available to labor methods
of economic pressure that would equalize the bargaining power of labor
and management.4 ° One such method which has long been recognized
with approval by the Board and the courts is the primary strike with its
traditional picket line.4
It would be nonsensical to hold that it is a protected activity for
employees to appeal to the employees of another employer to make com-
mon cause with them by refusing to cross their picket line, but that if
a worker accepts this appeal and refuses, he is engaging in conduct for
which he may be fired. Such a position would mean that the primary
picket line is the type of activity Congress guaranteed employees they
would be free to use without employer retaliation, with the additional
guarantee that it would be ineffective as a bargaining tactic.
From the previous analysis, it would seem that the Board was cor-
rect in granting protection to an employee's refusal, in the course of
his job, to cross a picket line at another employer's installation. This
position, however, would have created less confusion when reviewed
by the federal courts if the Board had articulated the rationale for its
decision.
ACCEPTABLE EMPLOYER RESPONSES
Although the Board failed to take into account the neutral employer's
interest before determining that the refusal to cross a picket line should be
protected, it did consider the employer's needs when it decided what
response the employer can make to this protected activity in order to
preserve his business operations. The Board originally concluded that the
employer could require the worker to elect to perform all his duties or
to vacate his job for a replacement. Firing the employee, however, was
an unacceptable response.4 2
By drawing this distinction between replacing a worker and firing
him for his refusal to cross a picket line, it is clear that the Board
originally intended that a refusing employee have the identical amount of
protection as a participant in a strike.4 The Supreme Court, however,
39. American Ship Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965).
40. See S. REP. No. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935), 2 LEG. HxSr. NLRA 2302: "The
second major objective of the bill is to encourage ... equality of bargaining power which
is a prerequisite to equality of opportunity and freedom to contract"
41. Printing Specialties Union v. NLRB, 171 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1948), cert denied,
336 U.S. 949 (1949).
42. Rockaway News Supply Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 336 (1951).
43. NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), reversing 92 F.2d 761(9th Cir. 1937), reversing 1 N.L.R.B. 201 (1936).
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stated in dicta that the Board's suggested distinction was "unrealistic."44
The Board then formulated, with little explanation,45 the new rule
that an employer may terminate an employee for his refusal to cross if
it is done solely to perserve his normal operations and so that he can
immediately, or within a short time, replace him with another who is
willing to perform the scheduled work.4 The refusal itself remains
protected, and the dismissed employee retains a right to be reinstated if
he unconditionally applies for reinstatment before he is replaced. 7
This position of the Board takes into account the competing interests
of the neutral employer and the employee refusing to cross the picket
line. It recognizes that there is an appreciable difference between the
ordinary striker and the employee who refuses to cross a picket line at
another employer's installation, the difference being that a striker does
not remain on the job, collecting his full pay and also interfering with
his employer's business operations while the employer searches for a
replacement. The right of the employer to terminate the employee im-
mediately upon his refusal guarantees the employer that he will not be
required to keep a worker on the job with full compensation while the
worker disrupts his business.
This rule also recognizes that an employee's interest in refusing to
cross a picket line, although great enough to merit the protection of
section 7,4" is not as great as his interest when striking against his own
employer. On the other hand, the employer's interest in running his
business efficiently is greater here than in the strike situation where he
is shut down entirely. Thus the employer is given more freedom to
respond to this protected activity in order to preserve his operations
than he is given in the strike situation.49 His immediate dismissal of
the refusing employee, without first hiring a replacement, will not be an
44. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 75 (1953). The Supreme
Court stated as dicta that the distinction drawn by the Board was not based on any differ-
ence in effect on the employee who refused to cross the picket line because once he had
gone out on strike against the company, his place would have been unquestionably filled
and the law applicable to replacement of strikers would then have applied. The Su-
preme Court's decision, however, was based on a clause in the collective bargaining agree-
ment denying employees the right to refuse to cross picket lines in the course of their job.
45. Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962), aff'd sub noim. Teamsters
Local 79 v. NLRB, 325 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1963). The Board interpreted this rejection
of its discharge-replacement theory to mean that the chronological order in which the
discharge and replacement took place should be irrelevant to a final determination of
whether the employer's dismissal of the worker was an unfair labor practice.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. See text at note 26 supra.
49. See NLRB v. MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), reversing 92 F.2d
761 (9th Cir. 1937), reversing 1 N.L.R.B. 201 (1936). This decision makes it clear that
discharging a striker before a replacement is hired is an unfair labor practice.
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unfair labor practice. The refusing employee also receives adequate pro-
tection for his section 7 right because he retains a right to be reinstated
which he can exercise at any time until he is replaced.
There is a strong indication that the Board will consider the length
of time the employer takes in replacing the dismissed employee in de-
termining whether the original termination was an unfair labor practice."
Such an approach is desirable, for if the employer is able to continue
his operations for an undue length of time by merely reassigning the
dismissed employee's work to his remaining employees, without hiring
a replacement, the original discharge could not have been made solely to
prevent substantial interference with normal operations. Evidence of delay
or failure to replace would make the original discharge an 8(a) (1) vio-
lation, and the dismissed employee would be entitled to reinstatement with
back pay. This would give an employee additional assurance that he
will be free from employer retaliation under the guise of an attempt to
preserve normal operations.
FEDERAL REVIEW OF BOARD DECISIONS
The federal courts have reviewed the Board's position on protection
for refusal to cross legal picket lines at other employers' installations on
only four occasions. Two of the cases avoided the issue of protection
for such activity by deciding the case on other issues." Where the federal
courts have touched on the issue of protection, their treatment has been
less than satisfactory.
The Second Circuit in NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co.,52 ac-
cepted, without deciding, the Board's position that the activity is pro-
tected, but limited that protection to the point that it was meaningless.
The court analogized the refusal to cross a picket line at another em-
ployer's installation to the solicitation cases53 and decided that the same
50. In Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1546 (1962), the Board stated
that the original dismissal of the employee who refused to cross the picket line is not an
unfair labor practice if done solely to preserve normal business operation and if the em-
ployer could immediately or within a short time thereafter replace him.
51. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in the Redwing Carriers
case, accepted the Board's finding that there was no § 8(a) (1) violation since the dis-
charge for the refusal to cross a picket line occurred only to protect the employer's
normal operations. It made no observations, however, regarding the Board's dictum that
the refusal of the employees to cross a legal picket line at a customer of their employer
was protected. In Overnite Transp. Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1271 (1965), aff'd sub norm.
Teamsters Local 728 v. NLRB, 4 CCH LAB. L. RaP. (53 Lab. Cas.) q 17129 (D.C.
Cir. 1966), the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia ruled that it need not con-
sider whether the refusal to cross the picket line at another employer's premise was pro-
tected since the evidence supported a § 8(a) (3) violation.
52. 197 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1952), afl'd, 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
53. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d 111, 113 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
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rules should apply.54 Therefore, the court decided that the employee has
the right to refuse to cross a picket line at another employer's premises
provided his refusal is on his own time and not while he is performing
his employment duties.55
By applying the Board's rules governing solicitation directly to cases
involving respect for picket lines, the court overlooked how carefully the
Board balanced the employees' interest in soliciting union members
against the employer's interest in operating his business efficiently be-
fore arriving at a set of rules which it felt gave a measure of protection
to both parties. 5 To apply these carefully balanced rules to a totally
different situation necessarily assumes that the employer's interest in
regulating his employees' activities during working time must always
outweigh the employees' rights to engage in section 7 conduct while on
the job. But the solicitation cases indicate that in certain circumstances,
even within this particular area, there must be a rebalancing of interests.57
If these rules cannot even be applied to the solicitation cases without a
frequent rebalancing of opposing interests, it would seem inconsistent to
apply them to an entirely different problem without examining the bal-
ancing process that led to the rules.
It is unlikely, moreover, that the employee could ever be subjected
to employer discipline for refusal to cross a picket line at another em-
ployer's installation while he was off the job, regardless of whether or
not the activity is protected. If an employer were to discharge the em-
ployee for so acting it would doubtlessly violate section 8(a) (3)5 since
the only plausible reason for the employer's action would be to discourage
union membership.
The Eighth Circuit in L. G. Everist, Inc., 9 like the Second Circuit,
54. See text at note 32 supra.
55. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d 111, 113 (2d Cir. 1952):
"The right to assist a union of which one is not a member by refusing to cross its picket
line is certainly of no higher dignity or importance to the individual than the right to
ask his fellow workers in his own plant to join with him in the union of which he is a
member in concerted activities which will directly protect or aid in promoting their com-
mon interests."
56. Republic Aviation Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 1186 (1943).
57. Peyton Packing Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 828, 843 (1943): "It is therefore within the
province of an employer to promulgate and enforce a rule prohibiting union solicitation
during working hours. Such a rule must be presumed to be valid.. . ." The fact that
such a rule is only presumptively valid would seem to indicate that in certain circum-
stances, where a union can show unusual reasons which necessitate soliciting during work-
ing time, the employees' rights to engage in this protected activity may outweigh the
interest of the employer to enforce his rules during working time.
58. National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1964):
"It shall 'be an unfair labor practice for an employer- (3) by discrimination in regard to
hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization. ..
59. 334 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1964).
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accepted, without deciding, the Board's contention that four truck drivers
who refused to cross a picket line at another employer's site during the
course of their jobs were engaging in protected activity. But it also ac-
cepted the Board's balancing of interests reflected in the rule that em-
ployees may refuse to cross a legal picket line at another installation while
they are on the job, subject to the right of the employer to discharge
them if their refusal substantially interferes with his normal operations."0
Furthermore, the court rejected the Board's limitation6' which would have
provided these discharged employees with the right to be reinstated
if their unconditional applications for reinstatement were made before
they were replaced.
The court decided that even though the activity was protected, the
protection was lost when the employees violated the terms and conditions
of their employment contracts by refusing to cross the picket line and
perform their duties. This decision creates the anomoly that protection
conferred on an employee by statute is lost when he becomes an employee.
Such a conclusion renders the theory of protection meaningless.
In order to temper the Eighth Circuit's anomalous position in L. G.
Everist, Inc., it might be argued that the decision must be limited to the
situation where the normal operations of the employer are substantially
interfered with before such a discharge is lawful.6" The Board had found
that there was sufficient interference with the employer's normal oper-
ations to justify the discharge since the four employees involved had
refused to complete their permanently assigned hauling routes. In a
subsequent Board case involving almost identical facts, except that the
employee did not have a permanently assigned route and received orders
by radio in his truck, the Board found that there was insufficient inter-
ference with the normal operations of the employer to justify the dis-
charge.63 This made the discharge itself an 8(a) (1) violation, and there-
60. In its decision in L. G. Everist, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 193 (1963), the Board had
found that the initial discharges were lawful since the refusal of the drivers to cross the
picket line substantially interfered with the employer's normal operations.
61. L. G. Everist, Inc., 142 N.L.R.B. 193, 194 (1963). The Board had ruled that "a
'discharge' for refusal to cross a picket line is an exception to the general rule that em-
ployees may not be discharged for engaging in protected concerted activity. It is there-
fore not a discharge for cause, but merely a permissible act in furtherance of the em-
ployer's overriding right to keep his business going by replacing such employees." There-
fore, an employer's refusal to reinstate unreplaced employees because of their refusal to
cross a picket line, violated § 8(a) (1) since it amounted to imposing a penalty for engag-
ig in this activity.
62. See Note, 78 HARv. L. REv. 1488, 1490 (1965). It may be inferred that since the
court accepted the Board's interpretation that the original discharges were lawful because
the refusals substantially interfered with the employer's normal operations, that the court
intended to limit the employer's right to discharge to the case where there was a substan-
tial interference with the maintenance of the employer's business, despite its strong lan-
guage that a violation of an employment contract is grounds for discharge.
63. Overnite Transp. Co., 154 N.L.R.B. 1271 (1965).
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fore the Board avoided the reinstatement problem created by the Eighth
Circuit where the initial discharge was lawful.
By adopting a more demanding showing of interference to establish
substantial interference with normal operations, the Board could give
the employee additional protection for his refusal to cross a picket line
and circumvent the reinstatement problem created by the Eighth Circuit.
This, of course, would mean that any appeal from the Board's determina-
tion would center around what constitutes substantial interference with
normal operations. This, however, appears to be a factual rather than
a legal determination which the courts are less likely to reverse on review
because of section 10(e)64 of the Act.
Since the federal courts have not passed on the merits of the question
whether an employee's refusal to cross a legal picket line at another em-
ployer's premises is protected activity, it would appear that the only way
employees can be assured that they will not be disciplined for their refus-
als to cross picket lines is to demand the inclusion of a clause granting
them this right in their collective bargaining agreements.
NoN-DIsCIPLINARY CLAUSES
Prior to the 1959 section 8(e)65 amendment to the National Labor
Relations Act, an employer and union could include a clause in their con-
tract granting employees the right to refuse to cross picket lines free
from disciplinary action. 6  Section 8(e), which invalidates express or
implied contracts in which the employer agrees with the union to cease
or refrain from handling the goods of another employer,67 would appear
to create substantial doubt as to the validity of such non-disciplinary
clauses.
After the 1959 amendment, the Board held in Teamsters Local 41388
that a contract clause69 which provided that a refusal to cross a picket
64. National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1964): 'The
finding of the Board with respect to questions of fact, supported by substantial evidence
on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive."
65. 73 Stat. 543 (1959), 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1964):
It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer
to enter into any contract or agreement, express or implied, whereby such em-
ployer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, sell-
ing, transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other em-
ployer, or to cease doing business with any other person, and any contract or
agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall
be to such extent unenforceable and void....
66. See Rockaway News Supply Co. v. NLRB, 345 U.S. 71 (1953).
67. This type of contractual clause is frequently referred to as a "hot-cargo agree-
ment."
68. 140 N.L.RB. 1474 (1963), modified, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C .Cir. 1964).
69. Teamsters Local 413, 140 N.L.R.B. 1474, 1476 (1963). The contract clause stated that
'It shall not be cause for discharge or disciplinary action in the event an employee refuses
to enter upon any property involved in a labor dispute or refuses to go through or work
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line would not be cause for discharge or disciplinary action was invalid
under section 8(e). The Board stated that such a collective bargaining
clause could be valid under 8 (e) only if it were limited to protected activi-
ties engaged in by employees against their own employer or limited to
the terms of the 8(b) (4) proviso.70
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals, however, disagreed
with the Board and held that the test of the validity of a clause immuniz-
ing employees from employer discipline upon refusal to cross a picket
line is "whether the picket line is primary in nature or in the promotion of
a secondary strike or boycott." A clause, therefore, which allows
workers to respect picket lines which have no secondary intent or object
is deemed lawful, even though the lines do not meet the specifications of
the 8(b) (4) proviso. 72
The court's construction of 8(e), as applied to collective bargaining
clauses dealing with respect for picket lines, is more consistent with the
legislative historyof this amendment73 than the Board's interpretation. It
is also consistent with the Board's own determination that a refusal to
cross a picket line at another employer's installation is protected by the
act regardless of whether the line meets the specifications of the 8(b) (4)
proviso.74
The Board subsequently revised its position and adopted the holding
of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, stating: "a collective
bargaining clause immunizing employees from employer discipline upon
refusal to cross a picket line is illegal only to the extent that it applies to
unlawful secondary activities."7 5
In Teamsters Local 695,76 the Board and court were presented with
behind any picket line, including the picket line of unions party to this agreement and
including picket lines at the employer's place or places of business."
70. See note 24 supra.
71. NLRB v. Teamsters Local 413, 334 F.2d 539 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
72. The Board, in its decision in Local 413, had also found the clause violative of
§ 8(e) because it was broad enough to sanction secondary refusals to cross secondary picket
lines.
73. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 20-21 (1959), 1 LEG. HisT. LMRDA 779,
and 105 CONG. REc. app. A8359 (1959), 2 LEG. HisT. LMRDA 1829, indicate that the pre-
vailing law of secondary boycotts was to govern in the application of § 8(e). The pre-
vailing law at the time § 8(e) was added to the National Labor Relations Act was that
refusals to cross primary picket lines were protected, primary activity, whether or not the
refusing employees came within the specifications of the § 8(b) (4) proviso. See note 26
supra.
74. The Board, in Everist and Redwing, did not limit the protection granted em-
ployees for refusing to cross primary picket lines to § 8(b) (4) proviso situations, nor did
they consider the possibility that by not limiting the protection to refusals meeting the
terms of the proviso, the activity might be illegal secondary activity under § 8(b) (4).
75. Teamsters Local 386, 145 N.L.R.B. 1475 (1964).
76. Teamsters Local 695, 152 N.L.R.B. 577 (1965), af'd sub nom. Teamsters Local
695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
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a slightly different problem under 8(e). The contract clause77 was
carefully worded to meet the specifications of the 8(b) (4) proviso,7"
but the Board found the clause violative of 8(e) to the extent it applied
to secondary activities. The union contended that the prohibitions of
8(e) forbidding express or implied contracts whereby the employer
agrees to cease or refrain from handling the goods of another employer
may be avoided if the clause is phrased in the terms of the proviso to
8(b) (4). The Board wisely rejected this argument and the Court of
Appeals affirmed the Board. To allow a union to circumvent 8(e)
merely by casting its hot-cargo clause in the terms of the 8(b) (4) pro-
viso would allow the union to write 8 (e) out of the act by a mere manipu-
lation of language.
There was, however, one argument offered by the union which
merits more careful consideration than the Board gave it. The union
pointed out that it is almost impossible for a worker to determine whether
a picket' line is primary or secondary. Even lawyers and courts have
difficulty in making such a determination.79  Therefore, it is unrealistic
to make the employee's rights depend upon a proper determination of the
primary nature of the picket line.
The Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 0 decision holds that an employee is
not protected by section 7 when he refuses to cross an illegal picket
line. Although the facts in that case indicate that the employees who
refused to cross the line were well aware that the line was illegal, the
Board went further and stated that an employee who refuses to cross
a picket line that is unprotected by the act loses the protection of section
7, whether or not he had knowledge that the line was unprotected.
Section 8(e) may preclude the union from including a clause
in its collective bargaining agreement that would protect its members from
employer discipline, but it does not necessarily follow that employees
who refuse to cross such picket lines in the absence of a contract clause,
should be denied the protection of section 7. This is especially true
since the effect of such a refusal on the secondary employer is in no
way altered by the line being secondary rather than primary; in both
instances he may immediately discharge the employee and replace him
with one willing to perform the scheduled work."
77. Teamsters Local 695, 152 N.L.R.B. 577, 579 (1965): 'No employee shall be sub-
ject to discipline by the employer for refusal to cross a picket line or enter upon the
premises of another employer, if the employees of such employer are engaged in an
authorized strike."
78. See note 24 supra.
79. Teamsters Local 695 v. NLRB, 361 F.2d 547 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
80. 107 N.L.R.B. 1547 (1954).
81. See Redwing Carriers, Inc., 137 N.L.R.B. 1545 (1962); L. G. Everist, Inc., 142
N.L.R.B. 193 (1963).
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Although Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. purports to merely limit the pro-
tection of section 7 to respect for legal picket lines, it could also have
the deleterious effect of limiting an employee's exercise of his right to
respect legal picket lines because of his reluctance to hazard a guess as
to the legality of the picket line. 2 Where the employee's job might be
dependent upon the accuracy of his guess, it is unlikely that he would be
willing to take advantage of his statutory right to refuse to cross a legal
picket line. Therefore, the "with or without" knowledge qualification
not only successfully deters an employee from refusing to cross illegal
picket lines, but, in many cases, can have the added effect of detering him
from exercising his right to respect legal picket lines.
The problem, therefore, is finding a way to effectuate an employee's
free exercise of his right to respect a legal picket line without encouraging
widespread observance of prohibited secondary picket lines. One solu-
tion that would allow the attainment of both of these objectives would
be to remove an employee's refusal to cross a picket line from the pro-
tection of section 7 only when he refuses to cross it with knowledge of
its illegality. Under this solution an employee, when he knows the line
is illegal, may not refuse to cross it and still remain under the protection
of the act. When, however, the determination is one that even the courts
have difficulty in making, he may refuse to cross the line and not have his
job dependent upon a subsequent determination by the Board that the
line was, in fact, secondary.
SUMMARY
Although the Board has declared that an employee's refusal, in the
course of his job, to cross a legal picket line at another employer's installa-
tion is protected, it has never articulated the reasons behind its decision.
As the above analysis indicates, there is support in logic for the Board's
position, which despite arguments to the contrary, should be sustained.
The Board, in determining those responses that an employer could
legally make to this activity, formulated the rule that the employer can
dismiss the refusing employee if done solely to preserve normal operations
and so that he can immediately or within a short time replace him with
another. The dismissed employee retains a right to be reinstated if he
makes his unconditional application before he is replaced.
The Board's discharge-replacement theory, although it appears to
adequately safeguard the employer's needs, is of little value to the em-
82. Under such decisions as Local 761, Int'l Union of Elec. Workers, 23 N.L.R.B.
1547 (1959), rev'd, 366 U.S. 677 (1961), and Sailor's Union, 92 N.L.R.B. 547 (1950), it
would be impossible for any employee to decide, upon encountering common situs pick-
eting, whether the line was primary or secondary.
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ployee unless it is combined with the right of reinstatement. If the
employer can terminate the employee, refuse to replace him, and also
deny his unconditional application for reinstatement, the effect on the
employee is the same as if he had been fired for engaging in a protected
activity. This is, in fact, the position that the Eighth Circuit has adopted
in the matter, but clearly this position should be overruled.
Many unions have guaranteed their members that they will not
be disciplined for refusing to cross picket lines by including a clause
granting them this right in their collective bargaining agreements. How-
ever, as pointed out above, such a clause is valid if it is limited to
immunizing employees from employer discipline for refusals to cross pri-
mary picket lines, but is illegal if it is broad enough to also cover unlaw-
ful secondary picket lines. Therefore, many union members do not realize
that the non-disciplinary clause in their collective bargaining contract is
invalid with respect to secondary picket lines. In this situation, the clause
becomes a nullity and the employee's rights depend on the legality of the
picket line.
In the absence of such a non-disciplinary clause, the Board, in an
attempt to prevent widespread 6bservance of secondary picket lines, has
held that an employee's refusal to cross a secondary picket line is
unprotected activity for which he can be fired, regardless of whether the
employee knew the line was illegal or not. This "with or without know-
ledge" qualification means that where an employee is unable to determine
whether the line is primary or secondary, he is protected if he refuses to
cross it and it is legal, but unprotected if he refuses to cross it and a
later Board determination concludes it was illegal. The employee's con-
tinued employment, therefore, may well depend on the accuracy of his
guess.
A better solution would be to remove an employee's refusal from
the protection of section 7 only when he refused to cross the picket line
with knowledge that the line was illegal. This will allow a worker to
freely exercise his right to refuse to cross legal picket lines without fear
that the line will subsequently be declared illegal, but will prevent him
from willfully refusing to cross lines which are clearly prohibited.
